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The BAROMETER is a student newspaper for the exchange of ideas 
and information concerning the development and improvement of 
the professional environment at NPS and within the U. S. Navy. 
OFFICERS, FACULTY, STAFF and WIVES 
are invited to contribute articles 
of interest to the BAROMETER 
c/o The Editor. 
Z-GRAM QUESTIONAlRE 
The selections which are given below are taken from the questionaires submitted in 
November. As before, the names of the contributors are omitted but the ranks are given. 
An attempt has been made to select representative comments without implying anything about 
the number of people who share a given opinion. 
(LCDR) Z-grams are about the same as trying to cure cancer with a bandaid. They miss the 
forest for the trees. As limited answers to limited problems they are adequate. However, 
the major problems are what they have always been, too much personnel turbulence, not 
enough adequate resources to do the job, and an absolutely disas trous bureaucracy (both 
military and civilian). Many officers view Z-grams as an infringement upon their inde-
pendence and as detrimental to discipline. On the one hand, the mere fact that so many 
people feel the changes are necessary points to the probability that they should have 
been made long ago, but weren't. So much for independence. Z-grams themselves do not 
change discipline; they merely impose new standards. The failure has been in the abdication 
of responsibility by many officers and senior PO's to enforce these new standards, who 
instead throw up their hands and sulk on the sidelines, and that is what is detrimental 
to discipline. 
Saying that the older generation (senior PO's and senior officers) do not understand 
the people below them is merely to say that they are poor leaders, in which case they 
~hould be eased out. However, understanding and knee-jerk acquiescence to every new idea 
and complaint is also a poor extreme. The mean, as usual, is in between and is equally 
difficult to see from either side of the age gap. 
What the Navy should do: 
(1) Stop the personnel turbulence; keep teams together and make use of people instead 
of worrying about "enhancing" their careers, making sure they touch all the bases. 
(2) Stop trying to cover all the commitments with inadequate resources, i.e. the "can 
do" attitude migh t win a promotion but the wear and tear on people shows up very rapidly, 
particularly when its "make work". 
(3) Get rid of the bureaucracy, i.e. take VADM Rickover's advice, start at the top, 
and get rid of the fat - military and civilian. Keep the leaders in this outfit and get 
rid of the managers, the epitome being Robert S. McNamara who "managed" the defense 
department into its present personnel and resource crisis. 
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Question 77 Many officers believe that command is not as attractive today as it has 
been or should be. Is this so? And if so, what do you think has caused the situation? 
Question 78 How would you go about enhancing the desirability of command? What specific 
steps would you take? 
(LCDR) Command as defined in Navy Regs is attractive. I have chosen the ED community 
partly because I consider myself a professional engineer, but mainly because commanders 
no longer have the absolute authority and responsibility that is rightfully theirs. An 
unfortunate product of this situation is the commander who willingly accepts the dilution 
of his responsibility. This type of commander is becoming prevalent, a trend which must 
be reversed if the U. S. Navy is to have any prestige in the world arena. [We should] 
preach Navy Regs as the gospel and have ADM Rickover distribute his crayons to unit 
commanders, type commanders and about 60% of the shore establishment. Send ships to sea 
with a stable crew, work them hard and give them all a taste of good liberty. 
(CDR) Command is not as attractive because the C. O.'s authority has been crippled and 
is responsibility clouded and increased. The most junior member of the crew now has 
access to higher authority than the C. O. Any E-2 can write directly to PERS-P (an 0-8) 
and be assured of a "warm" reply, while his C. O. mus t go through the chain of command 
and receive copies of his endorsements. [We should] reduce the number of staff officers 
whose whims the C. O. must satisfy, eliminate unnecessary levels of command, and correct 
the deficiencies stated above. 
(LT) Command is not a carrot; it has been treated as one. It requires of the C. O. more 
work than any of the J. O. 's and as a result, leadership by example. A good C. O. cannot 
lose touch with the other officers because he has no other job than to manage them. They, 
in turn, will do all the tasks expected of the command itself. Unwillingness of the C. O. 
to accept this leads to a cover-your-number because "I've got mine and I'm going to keep 
it" attitude. 
(LCDR) The definition of command is changing. The C. O. of a DLG is more of a manager, 
integrater, and synthesizer of his personnel and systems to meet a goal which is, in 
reality, only loosely defined by his superiors. Command is no longer equated with 
independence and the good life. Command is command whether it be at sea, ashore or a 
metal desk. Each of these entities must be commanded by the man and not command the man. 
This demand may not be attractive to the Naval officer who views the Navy as a large 
fraternal organization in which he can meander with satisfaction, rather than work purpose-
fully. 
Enhancing the desirability of command requires the commander of the commanding officer 
to provide him with one of two situations: 
(a) He must provide a physical plant which is operable and has the resources required 
to keep it operab Ie. (or) 
(b) He must provide a physical plant which requires improvement and provide the 
resources which are required to make the improvement. The Challenge to keep a sinking ship 
afloat is a real challenge and the man who succeeds in this difficult task can feel a 
well-deserved feeling of accomplishment. But what has been the purpose of the exercise if 
his successor must go through the drill again? Too often command becomes undesirable 
because the Commanding Officer is asked only to be a "house-keeper" of his charge. Specific 
steps to preclude undesirability require the commanding officer to be charged with a 
. ,ecific set of goals - though this charging need not be delineated to him; he must have 
t he ability to do his own charging. 
(LCDR) Yes. Why make the sacrifices required by command if most of the benefits available 
to commanding officers are also available to those who do not command? We should break 
the successful officer trap and compensate the "successful" officer significantly in com-
parison wi th his "unsuccessful" contemporaries. 
(LT) I personally have not witnessed anyone demeaning the opportunity to command. For 
those who do not believe command is their bag, it must be recognized that not everyone is 
capable of command. Command rank is not bestowed with an infusion of wisdom and courage 





(1) Stable manning at proper levels 
(2) Firm operating schedules, with firm support from shore facilities, i.e. cut down 
short fuzed RAV's, crash, half-supported loadouts. 
(3) Continue to move CJ!.Nay from heroic ''We can do anything" ideas. Don't send ships 
to sea for trivial requirements, half prepared. 
(4) Turn ships over to the yards during overhauls, decommission them, and transfer 
the crew; then, at the end, recommission the ship with a new crew and C. O. 
Question 79 Do you believe that the junior officer is challenged enough to make him 
believe that his work is worthwhile? What specific steps would you recommend to enable 
the junior officer to feel that he is needed and that he is achieving something? 
Question 80 Do you believe that senior officers (commander and above) understand the true 
needs, wishes and attitudes of the junior officers with whom they work? Is there a 
realistic two-way communication of convictions between the two levels of officers? What 






No. The Old Man is scrambling like hell to keep the ship running and operationally 
He is generally short of people, money and parts, and is still the "can-do" sailor. 
a few people to say "If you want a safe and professionally run ship, we can-do for 
long." When the Old Man stands up and is counted for the sincere good of his men, 
doesn't need to go to his J.~. 's ; they'll come to him. 
(CDR) There is no two-way communications between senior officers and J.~. 'so Senior 
officers are too worried about their careers; they don't want to rock the boat and in many 
cases do not pass info about bad things to their boss. I've seen this over and over, 
especially in Washington. 
(LTJG) I feel it is impossible for any senior officer (whether he is civilian or military) 
to be able to unders tand fully and thoroughly the problem; of junior officers (and the 
younger enlisted as well) who are also juniors in age (for the majority of the cases) to 
their senior officers. A solution to the problem has already been adapted by CNO who is 
creating junior officer boards so that the problems will be aired by juniors as well as 
seniors. 
(LCDR) In mas t cases yes. Again, the situation will vary. "Senior officer" should not 
conjure up an image of a grey-bearded old man - in fact our "senior officers" are quite 
young and generally excellent adminis trators • Bas ic leadership has not changed wi th Z-grams •. 
But they may have reminded some officers of the tenets. 
(LT) The Junior officer is challenged enough but unfortunately lacks the level of pro-
fessional education to effectively meet the demands made upon him. Recent steps in the 
~urface community to establish a division officer's school will be of help in this regard. 
Too often, senior officers have not understood that their juniors really do want to do 
the best job possible but lack sufficient background. As stated above the junior officer, 
particularly surface, needs far more professional training than most presently have. 
(LT) The junior officer in the past assumed all the menial tasks that were above the 
senior officers. My solution would be aimed at making the junior officers assistant 
department heads under the guidance of the senior officer, but make the junior officer 
responsible for the task of his particular department. The senior officer will be used as 
an advisor. Also, the senior officer will assume the assorted tasks normally assigned to 
junior officers. This arrangement will provide a double benefit: (1) the J. O. receives 
valuable training and responsibility; (2) the senior officer assumes a position more equal 
to his civilian counterpart (executive) and his duties are more in line with the position 
of a commanding officer. That is, he is more of an overall coordinator due to his advisory 
duties and other tasks. 
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No, I do not believe senior officers know or understand junior officers today. We 
still retain many ideas of strict adherence to tradition and many seniors assume they are 
always right. The junior officer's ideas and comments often go unheeded. Many times a 
new idea or better way is lost due to lack of communication. Possibly a junior officer 
board which included the CO and XO could be an integral part of each organization and 
used expressly for J.O. 's inputs to command policies and presentation of new thoughts on 
any existing policies. If something like this were implemented, it should be controlled 
by the junior officers. It would not be a formal board, therefore no time or manhours 
would be lost to paperwork. 
(LT) Of course, this all depends on the senior officer. I think most of the C.O. 's I 
have seen have had a gap between their J.O.'s and themselves. Not in official communica-
tions, but on a person-to-person basis, an informal basis. I think this hurts both people. 
Of the really great skippers I've seen, they've presented themselves as a "real person" 
to their J. O. 'so And in being friends on an informal basis caused the J. O.'s to really 
Qut out and do a good job in everything. 
(LCDR) The challenge of a man's work is a product of his personal pride and command 
demand. Emphasis on the latter would maintain a challenge for many J.O. 'so 
(LCDR) There are two people required to make any job challenging and rewarding: The 
J. O. himself and his evaluator (usually his XO or CO). There is no unimportant job, but 
there are unimportant people ••••• I believe this question is asking "Do CDR's and above 
possess true leadership abilities and do they actually carry these traits out?" This is 
not a new problem, as John Paul Jones will bear me out. 
(LCDR) Some do, some don't. That's no great revelation - just human nature. Some senior 
officers look ~ all the time. Generally, the communications link is there; it takes the 
senior man to convince the juniors to use it on a local level. 
(LT) Challenge does not make a man feel his work is worthwhile; it makes him interested. 
Productiveness makes him feel worthwhile and the elimination of jobs such as savings bond 
officer ••• is a good start to provide the J. O. with some time to be productive (for a 
change). Generally speaking, yes (there is a lack of communications). The way to improve 
it is not a J. O. OMBUDSMAN or Advisory Board or any of the other boards or representatives 
now used to solve "lack of communications". Personal contact is the only way to show a 
man that you are interested in him, and not personal contact with his representative. 
This approach works well betwee;-Division Officers and the men in their divisions and 
would be just as beneficial between senior officers (Capt. and above) and junior officers. 
(LCDR) The problem is that the challenge migh t be harder to recognize now since pro-
fessionalism is seriously lacking. Few seek out responsibility. Some attitudes of juniors 
are simply not acceptable alternatives and juniors have to learn to swallow disappointment 
as part of the maturing process. 
(LT) [Do the juniors and seniors communicate?] The interested ones do. Get interested! 
